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ABSTRACT
Relations between users on social media sites often reflect
a mixture of positive (friendly) and negative (antagonistic)
interactions. In contrast to the bulk of research on social net-
works that has focused almost exclusively on positive inter-
pretations of links between people, we study how the inter-
play between positive and negative relationships affects the
structure of on-line social networks. We connect our anal-
yses to theories of signed networks from social psychology.
We find that the classical theory of structural balance tends
to capture certain common patterns of interaction, but that it
is also at odds with some of the fundamental phenomena we
observe — particularly related to the evolving, directed na-
ture of these on-line networks. We then develop an alternate
theory of status that better explains the observed edge signs
and provides insights into the underlying social mechanisms.
Our work provides one of the first large-scale evaluations of
theories of signed networks using on-line datasets, as well
as providing a perspective for reasoning about social media
sites.
Author Keywords
signed networks, structural balance, status theory, positive
edges, negative edges, trust, distrust.
ACM Classification Keywords
H.5.3 Information Systems: Group and Organization Inter-
faces—Web-based interaction.
General Terms
Human Factors, Measurement, Design.
INTRODUCTION
Social network analysis provides a useful perspective on a
range of social computing applications. The structure of net-
works arising in such applications offers insights into pat-
terns of interactions, and reveals global phenomena at scales
that may be hard to identify when looking at a finer-grained
resolution. At the same time, there is an ongoing challenge
in adapting such network approaches to the study of social
computing: users develop rich relationships with one an-
other in these settings, while network analyses generally re-
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duce these complex relationship to the existence of simple
pairwise links. It is a fundamental research problem to bridge
the gap between the richness of the existing relationships and
the stylized nature of network representations of these rela-
tionships.
The main focus of our work here is to examine the inter-
play between positive and negative links in social media —
a dimension of on-line social network analysis that has been
largely unexplored. With relatively few exceptions (e.g., [1,
15, 16]), research in on-line social networks has focused on
contexts in which the interactions have largely only positive
interpretations — that is, connecting people to their friends,
fans, followers, and collaborators. But in many settings it is
important to also explicitly take negative relations into con-
sideration, especially when studying interactions in social
media: discussion lists are filled with controversy and dis-
agreement, and social-networking sites harbor antagonism
alongside amity. The richness of a social network in such
cases generally consists of a mixture of both positive and
negative interactions, co-existing in a single structure.
We aim to develop a better understanding of the role that net-
work structure plays when some links between people are
positive while others are negative. For instance, in on-line
rating sites such as Epinions, people can give both positive
and negative ratings not only to items but also to other raters.
In on-line discussion sites such as Slashdot, users can tag
other users as “friends” and “foes”. Our approach here is
to adapt and extend theories from social psychology to an-
alyze these types of signed networks as they arise in social
computing applications. These theories enable us to char-
acterize the differences between the observed and predicted
configurations of positive and negative links in on-line so-
cial networks. We also use contrasts between the theories to
draw inferences about how links are being used in particular
social computing applications. In addition to insights into
the applications themselves, our studies provide, to the best
of our knowledge, some of the first large-scale evaluations
of these social-psychological theories via on-line datasets.
Positive and negative links in on-line data. To carry out
such an investigation, we need two fundamental ingredients:
(i) large-scale datasets from social applications where the
sign of each link — whether it is positive or negative — can
be reliably determined, and (ii) theories of signed networks
that help us reason about how different patterns of positive
and negative links provide evidence for the expression of dif-
ferent kinds of relationships across these applications.
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Figure 1. Undirected signed triads. Based on the number of positive
edges we label triads with odd number of pluses as balanced (T3, T1),
and triads with even positive edges (T2, T0) as unbalanced.
We investigate social network structures from three widely-
used Web sites. The first is the trust network of Epinions,
where users create signed directed relations to each other in-
dicating trust or distrust. The second is the social network of
the technology blog Slashdot, where users designate others
as “friends” or “foes.” The third is the network defined by
votes for Wikipedia admin candidates. When a Wikipedia
user is considered for a promotion to the status of an ad-
min, the community is able to cast public votes in favor of
or against the promotion of this admin candidate. We view
a positive vote as corresponding to a positive link from the
voter to the candidate, and a negative vote as a negative link.
The Epinions and Slashdot networks are explicitly presented
to users as social networking features of the sites, whereas in
the case of Wikipedia the network interpretation is implicit.
The meanings of positive and negative signs are different
across these settings, and this is precisely the point: we wish
to use theories of signed edges to evaluate how the posi-
tive and negative edges are being used in each setting, and
to identify commonalities and differences in the underlying
networks in relatively different application contexts. More-
over, while the current work focuses on domains in which
the signs of edges are overtly denoted (either explicitly by
direct linking, or implicitly through actions such as voting
on Wikipedia), we believe the underlying issues reach more
broadly into any application where positive and negative at-
titudes between users can be conveyed, such as through sen-
timent in text [20].
Theories of signed networks: Balance. We analyze these
on-line signed networks using two different theories, and a
central issue in our study is the extent to which each of these
theories provides a plausible explanation for the structure
and dynamics of the observed networks.
The first of these theories is structural balance theory, which
originated in social psychology in the mid-20th-century. As
formulated by Heider in the 1940s [14], and subsequently
cast in graph-theoretic language by Cartwright and Harary
[4], structural balance considers the possible ways in which
triangles on three individuals can be signed, and posits that
triangles with three positive signs (three mutual friends, Fig-
ure 1 T3) and those with one positive sign (two friends with a
common enemy, Fig. 1 T1) are more plausible — and hence
should be more prevalent in real networks — than triangles
with two positive signs (two enemies with a common friend,
T2) or none (three mutual enemies, T0). Balanced triangles
with three positive edges exemplify the principle that “the
friend of my friend is my friend,” whereas those with one
positive and two negative edges capture the notions that “the
friend of my enemy is my enemy,” “the enemy of my friend
is my enemy,” and “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Structural balance theory has been developed extensively in
the time since this initial work [21], including the formula-
tion of a variant — weak structural balance — proposed by
Davis in the 1960s as a way of eliminating the assumption
that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” [7]. In partic-
ular, weak structural balance posits that only triangles with
exactly two positive edges are implausible in real networks,
and that all other kinds of triangles should be permissible.
Theories of signed networks: Status. Balance theory can
be viewed as a model of likes and dislikes. However, as
Guha et al. observe in the context of Epinions [13], a signed
link from A to B can have more than one possible inter-
pretation, depending on A’s intention in creating the link.
In particular, a positive link from A may mean, “B is my
friend,” but it also may mean, “I think B has higher status
than I do.” Similarly, a negative link from A to B may mean
“B is my enemy” or “I think B has lower status than I do.”
Here we develop this idea into a new theory of status, which
provides a different organizing principle for directed net-
works of signed links. In this theory of status, we consider
a positive directed link to indicate that the creator of the link
views the recipient as having higher status; and a negative
directed link indicates that the recipient is viewed as having
lower status. These relative levels of status can then be prop-
agated along multi-step paths of signed links, often leading
to different predictions than balance theory.
Comparing the two theories. To give a sense for how the
differences between status and balance arise, consider the
situation in which a user A links positively to a user B, and
B in turn links positively to a user C. If C then forms a link
to A, what sign should we expect this link to have? Balance
theory predicts that since C is a friend of A’s friend, we
should see a positive link from C to A. Status theory, on the
other hand, predicts that A regardsB as having higher status,
and B regards C as having higher status — so C should
regard A as having low status and hence be inclined to link
negatively to A. In other words, the two theories suggest
opposite conclusions in this case.
Thus balance theory predicts that certain types of triads such
as all-positive cycles should be overrepresented compared to
chance, whereas status theory makes predictions that often
differ. We study all the possible types of signed triads and
the predictions made by the different theories. In doing so
we consider several experimental conditions, including both
directed and undirected networks, as well as both respecting
and ignoring the order in which edges were created. For
each such experimental condition we consider whether the
observed number of triads of each type is overrepresented
or underrepresented compared to chance, and contrast that
with the predictions made by the balance and status theories.
This analysis give us a picture of the aggregate patterns of
links in the social networks, and the degree to which they
are explained in terms of each theory.
Summary of Findings: Comparison of Balance and Sta-
tus. Both of these theories concern relationships between
people; by adapting them to our on-line network datasets,
they provide potentially informative perspectives on the link
structures we find there.
Balance theory was initially intended as a model for undi-
rected networks, although it has been commonly applied to
directed networks by simply disregarding the directions of
the links [21]. When we do this, we find significant align-
ment between the observed network data and Davis’s notion
of weak structural balance: triangles with exactly two posi-
tive edges are massively underrepresented in the data relative
to chance, while triangles with three positive edges are mas-
sively overrepresented. In two of the three datasets, triangles
with three negative edges are also overrepresented, which is
at odds with Heider’s formulation of balance theory. These
findings are already intriguing, since it has traditionally been
difficult to evaluate the predictions of structural balance the-
ory on large network datasets. Rather, empirical investi-
gations to date have generally focused on small networks
where social relations can be observed through direct inter-
action with the individuals involved (see e.g. [8]). The trou-
ble with assessing structural balance at small scales is that
one expects its predictions to be aggregate rather than abso-
lute — that is, one expects to see certain kinds of triangles
as statistically more abundant or less abundant in the data,
and the significance of such biases towards certain kinds of
triangles can stand out much more clearly when they are ac-
cumulated over a large amount of data.
Ultimately, however, we would like to understand the net-
works in these on-line systems as directed structures that
evolve over time. When we view the network data in this
way, our main conclusion is that the theory of status is more
effective at explaining local patterns of signed links, and that
it naturally extends to capture richer aspects of user behav-
ior, including heterogeneity in their linking tendencies. For
example in the case offered as an illustration above, where
user A links positively to user B and user B links positively
to user C, we find that negative links from C to A are mas-
sively overrepresented relative to chance, with positive links
correspondingly underrepresented.
Implications. There are several potentially interesting im-
plications of our results. First, the comparison of balance
and status provides insights into ways in which people use
linking mechanisms in social computing applications. In
particular, there are important domains such as rating re-
viewers on Epinions and voting for admins on Wikipedia in
which such links appear, in aggregate, to be used more dom-
inantly for expressions of status than for expressions of likes
and dislikes.
The contrast between balance and status is also related to the
distinction between undirected and directed interpretations
of links. Our findings suggest that it is important to under-
stand the roles of different theories in both undirected and
directed representations of networks. Indeed, the theory of
status only makes sense with directed links — since it posits
a status differential from the creator of a link to its recipient
— while the theory of balance has been applied in both undi-
rected and directed settings (e.g., [21]). The fact that (weak)
balance is broadly consistent with the undirected representa-
tion of our network data, while status is more consistent with
the directed representation, shows that it possible for differ-
ent theories to be appropriate to different levels of resolution
in the representation of a single network.
In the final part of the paper, we describe further structural
investigations that provide insight into ways in which signed
links are used in these applications. First, we find that as-
pects of the theory of balance hold more strongly on the
subset of links in these networks that are reciprocated —
consisting of directed links in both directions between two
users. This suggests that reciprocal link formation may fol-
low a different pattern of use in these systems than unrecip-
rocated link formation. However, it is important to note that
such reciprocal relations account for only a small proportion
of the links between people on these sites.
Second, we find a connection between the sign of a link and
the extent to which it is embedded [12], i.e., with the two
endpoints having links to many common neighbors. A link
is significantly more likely to be positive when its two end-
points have multiple neighbors (of either sign) in common.
This observation is consistent with qualitative notions of so-
cial capital [3, 5] — users with common neighbors have rela-
tions that are “on display” in a social sense, and hence have
greater implicit pressure to remain positive. Indeed in the
three different social applications that we study, this effect is
strongest in the case of voting for Wikipedia admins, which
is the setting that makes the relations most prominently visi-
ble to users. This suggests some of the ways in which the
presence of common neighbors, and more overt forms of
public display, can have an effect on the use of signed links.
These findings about aggregate structural properties also be-
gin to address a broad and largely open issue, which is to
understand the sources of individual variation in linking be-
havior. While reciprocation and embeddedness are only two
dimensions along which to explore such variation, we be-
lieve that the definitions and analysis pursued here can help
in framing further investigation of questions regarding indi-
vidual variation.
RELATED WORK
There is by now a large and rapidly growing literature on the
analysis of social networks arising in on-line domains [18];
as we noted at the outset, this line of work has almost exclu-
sively treated networks as implicitly having positive signs
only. For example, portions of our analysis can be viewed
as variants on the problem of link prediction [17] and tie-
strength prediction [10], but in each case adapted to take the
signs of links into account.
Two recent papers in the analysis of on-line social networks
stand out as taking the signs of links into account. Brzo-
zowski et al. study the positive and negative relationships
that exist on ideologically oriented sites such as Essembly
[1], but with the goal of predicting outcomes of group votes
rather than the broader organization of the social network.
Kunegis et al. study the friend/foe relationships on Slash-
dot, and compute global network properties [15], but do not
evaluate theories of balance and status as we do here.
Epinions Slashdot Wikipedia
Nodes 119,217 82,144 7,118
Edges 841,200 549,202 103,747
+ edges 85.0% 77.4% 78.7%
− edges 15.0% 22.6% 21.2%
Triads 13,375,407 1,508,105 790,532
Table 1. Dataset statistics.
Symbol Meaning
Ti Signed triad, also the number of triads of type Ti
∆ Total number of triads in the network
p Fraction of positive edges in the network
p(Ti) Fraction of triads Ti, p(Ti) = Ti/∆
p0(Ti) A priori prob. of Ti (based on sign distribution)
E[Ti] Expected number of triads Ti, E[Ti] = p0(Ti)∆
s(Ti) Surprise, s(Ti) = (Ti −E[Ti])/
√
∆p0(Ti)(1− p0(Ti))
Table 2. Table of symbols.
There are also large bodies of work involving negative rela-
tionships in on-line domains that pursue directions different
from our network focus here. One line of work focuses on
norms to control deviant behavior in on-line communities
(e.g. [6] and the references therein). In a different direction,
a large body of recent work in sentiment analysis [20] has
studied on-line textual data in which individuals can express
both positive and negative attitudes toward one another, but
without addressing the consequences for network structure.
The datasets we study here have also been investigated by
researchers for other purposes. Guha et al. study the trust
network of Epinions [13]. Lampe et al. study the user rating
mechanisms on Slashdot [16]. Burke and Kraut study the
voting process that produces our Wikipedia signed network
[2], but with the goal of modeling election outcomes.
Finally, the notion of status plays a role in many lines of
work in the social sciences, such as the role that behavior-
status theory plays in social exchange theory [9, 22]. How-
ever, these notions are distinct from the ways in which we
formulate definitions of status as a counterpart to balance in
signed directed networks.
DATASET DESCRIPTION
As described above, we consider three large online social
networks where links are explicitly positive or negative: (i)
the trust network of the Epinions product review Web site,
where users can indicate their trust or distrust of the reviews
of others; (ii) the social network of the blog Slashdot, where
a signed link indicates that one user likes or dislikes the com-
ments of another; and (iii) the voting network of Wikipedia,
where a signed link indicates a positive or negative vote by
one user on the promotion to admin status of another.
Table 1 gives statistics for all three datasets. Our networks
have on the approximate order of tens to hundreds of thou-
sand nodes, and less than a million edges. In each network
the edges are inherently directed, since we know which user
created the edge. In all networks the background proportion
of positive edges is about the same, with roughly 80% of the
edges having a positive sign.
ANALYSIS OF UNDIRECTED NETWORKS
We begin by analyzing the network data in an undirected
representation, where we do not take the directions of links
Triad Ti |Ti| p(Ti) p0(Ti) s(Ti)
Epinions
T3 + ++ 11,640,257 0.870 0.621 1881.1
T1 + −− 947,855 0.071 0.055 249.4
T2 + +− 698,023 0.052 0.321 -2104.8
T0 − −− 89,272 0.007 0.003 227.5
Slashdot
T3 + ++ 1,266,646 0.840 0.464 926.5
T1 + −− 109,303 0.072 0.119 -175.2
T2 + +− 115,884 0.077 0.406 -823.5
T0 − −− 16,272 0.011 0.012 -8.7
Wikipedia
T3 + ++ 555,300 0.702 0.489 379.6
T1 + −− 163,328 0.207 0.106 289.1
T2 + +− 63,425 0.080 0.395 -572.6
T0 − −− 8,479 0.011 0.010 10.8
Table 3. Number of balanced and unbalanced undirected triads.
into account. In this context, we can evaluate the predictions
of structural balance theory by considering the frequencies
of different types of signed triads — sets of three nodes with
signed edges among all pairs.
Table 3 gives the counts of the four possible signed undi-
rected triads, while Table 2 summarizes the symbols we use
throughout the paper. Let p denote the fraction of positive
edges in the network. The four possible signed undirected
triads are denoted T0, T1, T2, and T3 (Figure 1). Among all
triads in the data, the number that are of type Ti is denoted
|Ti| and the fraction of type Ti is denoted p(Ti). Now, we
would like to compare how this empirical frequency of triad
types compares to the corresponding frequencies if edge signs
were produced at random from the same background distri-
bution of positive and negative signs. Thus, we shuffle the
signs of all edges in the graph (keeping the fraction p of pos-
itive edges the same), and we let p0(Ti) denote the expected
fraction of triads that are of type Ti after this shuffling.
If p(Ti) > p0(Ti), then triads of type Ti are overrepresented
in the data relative to chance; if p(Ti) < p0(Ti), then they
are underrepresented. We also want to measure how signif-
icant this over- or underrepresentation is. Thus, we define
the surprise s(Ti) to be the number of standard deviations
by which the actual quantity of type-Ti triads differs from
the expected number under the random-shuffling model.
Due to the Central Limit Theorem the distribution of s(Ti)
is approximately a standard normal distribution and so we
would expect surprise on the order of tens to already be sig-
nificant (s(Ti) = 6 gives a p-value of ≈ 10−8). However,
the values of surprise we find in our data are typically much
larger. This means that due to the scale of the data and the
large number of triads almost all our observations are statis-
tically significant with p-values practically equal to zero.
We find that the all-positive triad T3 is heavily overrepre-
sented in all three datasets, and the triad T2 consisting of two
enemies with a common friend is heavily underrepresented.
Based on the relative magnitudes of p(Ti) and p0(Ti), we
see that T3 tends to be over represented by about 40% in all
three datasets. Similarly, the unbalanced triad T2 is under-
represented by about 75% in Epinions and Slashdot and 50%
in Wikipedia. These observations so far fit well into Heider’s
original notion of structural balance.
However, the relative abundances of triad types T1 (single
positive edge) and T0 (all negative edges) differ between
the datasets, and none of the datasets follow Heider’s theory
in both having T1 overrepresented and T0 underrepresented.
Thus, the picture is more consistent with Davis’s weaker no-
tion of balance, where T2 is viewed as implausible but there
is no a priori reason to favor one of T1 or T0 over the other.
ANALYSIS OF EVOLVING DIRECTED NETWORKS
We now consider the networks in these systems as directed
graphs, incorporating the fact that the links being created go
from one user to another, with the sign of a link from A to
B being generated by A. In the introduction, we discussed
how the theories of balance and status offer competing inter-
pretations for how we should expect such directed links to
be signed. For example, as noted there, positive cycles —
that is, directed triads with positive links from A to B to C
to A — are underrepresented in the data. This conflicts with
balance theory, but is consistent with status theory.
Timing and Diversity: Generative and Receptive Base-
lines. Beyond just the directionality of links, there are ad-
ditional features of the data that we take into account when
evaluating these models. First, links are created at specific
points in time, so rather than thinking of directed triads as
existing in a static snapshot of the network, we consider the
order in which links are added to the network. Thus, we
study how directed triads form, as follows. When a user A
links to a user B, suppose there is already a user X with the
property that X has links to or from A, and also to or from
B. This means there is a two-step semi-path from A to B
through X (a path in which the directions of the edges do
not matter), and the formation of the A-B link adds a short-
cut to this path, producing a directed triad on A, B, and X .
Second, different users make use of positive and negative
signs differently. At the most basic level, some users pro-
duce links almost exclusively of one sign or the other, while
others produce a relatively even mix of both positive and
negative links. We will refer to the overall fraction of posi-
tive signs that a user creates, considering all her links, as her
generative baseline. Similarly, some users receive links that
are almost exclusively of one sign or the other, while others
receive a mix of signs. We will refer to the overall fraction
of positive signs in the links a user receives as his receptive
baseline. Given this, we should compare the abundance of
positive and negative links to the generative and receptive
baselines of the users producing and receiving these links.
Once we incorporate these aspects of the data, we discover
further mysteries — beyond just the scarcity of positive cy-
cles — that seem to call for alternatives to balance theory.
For example, consider the case of joint positive endorsement
— a situation in which a node X links positively to each of
two nodes A and B. Suppose that in this case, A now forms
a link to B (i.e., triad t9 of Figure 2); should we expect there
to be an elevated probability of the link being positive, or a
reduced probability of the link being positive?
In fact, in our data, the question turns out to have a more
subtle answer than either of these alternatives. The link that
is produced in this situation is more likely to be positive than
the generative baseline of A, but at the same time less likely
to be positive than the receptive baseline of B. Balance the-
ory, of course, makes a much more naive prediction: since A
and B are both friends of X , they should be friends of each
other. Can status theory explain this dual and opposite pair
of deviations from the baselines of A and B?
We now show that in fact it can, and explaining how this
works forms the motivation for a theory of how status effects
can influence the signs of directed links.
Formulating a Theory of Status
Since the phenomenon we are trying to capture is subtle but
in the end familiar from everyday life, we begin with a hy-
pothetical example to motivate the subsequent definitions.
A Motivating Example. Suppose we were to interview the
players on a college soccer team: for certain players A, and
certain teammates B of A, we ask, “How do you think the
skill of player B compares to yours?” Suppose further that
the players roughly agree on a ranking of each other by skill,
which serves as an approximate (though not perfect) ranking
of the team members by status. From the results of these
interviews, we could produce a signed directed graph whose
nodes are the players, and with a directed edge from A to B
if we asked A for her opinion of B. A positive link fromA to
B would indicate that A thinks highly of B’s skill relative to
her own, while a negative link would indicate that A thinks
she is better than B.
If we were just given this signed directed graph, and knew
nothing else about the soccer team, then we could still make
inferences about the signs of links that we haven’t yet ob-
served, using the context provided by the rest of the network.
Suppose for example that we are about to ask player A’s
opinion of another player B, but we don’t currently have
A’s answer and hence don’t yet know the sign of the link
from A to B. We can nonetheless make predictions about it
from the links whose signs we do know, as follows. Suppose
that we know from the data already collected that A and B
have each received a positive evaluation from a third player
X . Here is a pair of facts we could conjecture about the link
from A to B, given the positive links from X to A and B.
• Since B has been positively evaluated by another team
member, B is more likely than not to have above-average
skill. Therefore, the evaluation that A gives B should be
more likely to be positive than an evaluation given by A
to a random team member.
• Since A has been positively evaluated by another team
member, A is also more likely than not to have above-
average skill. Therefore, the evaluation that A gives B
should be less likely to be positive than an evaluation re-
ceived by B from a random team member.
There are several subtleties here. First, we’re using the indi-
rection provided by a third party X to make inferences about
the relation between A and B, based on assumptions about
status. Second, the context provided by X causes the sign of
the A-B link to deviate from a random baseline in different
directions depending on whether we’re looking at it fromA’s
point of view or B’s point of view. More precisely, since B
has above-average skill, A will likely give B a higher evalu-
ation than A would give to a random team member. On the
other hand, since A has above-average skill, B is less likely
to receive a positive evaluation from A than she would re-
ceive from a random team member. Despite the complexity
of these conclusions, they reflect genuine and natural prop-
erties of status ordering among a group of people. They also
agree with our observations about joint positive endorsement
in the data mentioned above.
We turn now to the data, where we will find that the users
of these on-line networks create signed links in ways that
correspond closely to the behavior of the players on our hy-
pothetical soccer team. But extracting this finding from the
data will require formulating a sequence of definitions that
captures the intuition suggested by this example.
Contextualized Links. The first portion of our definitions
capture the idea that we will evaluate the sign of a link cre-
ated from A to B in the context of A and B’s relations to
additional nodes X with whom they have links. (For exam-
ple, the node X in our example who jointly endorses A and
B.) Thus, we define a contextualized link (more briefly, a
c-link) to be a triple (A,B;X) with the the property that a
link forms from A to B after each of A and B already has a
link either to or from X . Overall there are sixteen different
types of c-links, as the edge between X and A can go in ei-
ther direction and have either sign yielding four possibilities,
and similarly for the edge between X and B, for a total of
4 · 4 = 16. For each of these types of c-links we are inter-
ested in the frequencies of positive versus negative labels for
the edge from A to B. Figure 2 shows all the possible types
of c-links, labeled t1–t16.
Now, for a particular type of c-link, we look at the set of all
c-links (A,B;X) of this type, and ask: what fraction of the
links from A to B in this set are positive? Moreover, how
does this fraction compare to what one would expect from
the generative baselines of the nodes A and the receptive
baselines of the nodes B that are involved in the creation
of these A-B links? If we can quantify the answer to this
question in our data, we can look for effects like we saw in
our motivating example — there, in the case of positive links
from X to A and B, we believed the likelihood of a positive
A-B edge should exceed the generative baseline of A but
should lie below the receptive baseline of B.
Let’s consider a particular type t of c-link, and suppose that
(A1, B1;X1), (A2, B2;X2), . . . , (Ak, Bk;Xk) is a list of all
instances of this type t of c-link in our data. We define the
generative baseline for this type t to be the sum of the gen-
erative baselines of all nodes Ai. This quantity is simply the
expected number of positive edges we would get if we let
each Ai-Bi link form according to the generative baseline
of Ai. We then define the generative surprise sg(t) for this
type t to be the (signed) number of standard deviations by
which the actual number of positive Ai-Bi edges in the data
differs above or below this expectation. In other words, if
the context provided by the node X and its links with A and
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ti count P (+) sg sr Bg Br Sg Sr
t1 178,051 0.97 95.9 197.8 X X X X
t2 45,797 0.54 -151.3 -229.9 X X X ◦
t3 246,371 0.94 89.9 195.9 X X ◦ X
t4 25,384 0.89 1.8 44.9 ◦ ◦ X X
t5 45,925 0.30 18.1 -333.7 ◦ X X X
t6 11,215 0.23 -15.5 -193.6 ◦ ◦ X X
t7 36,184 0.14 -53.1 -357.3 X X X X
t8 61,519 0.63 124.1 -225.6 X ◦ X X
t9 338,238 0.82 207.0 -239.5 X ◦ X X
t10 27,089 0.20 -110.7 -449.6 X X X X
t11 35,093 0.53 -7.4 -260.1 ◦ ◦ X X
t12 20,933 0.71 17.2 -113.4 ◦ X X X
t13 14,305 0.79 23.5 24.0 ◦ ◦ X X
t14 30,235 0.69 -12.8 -53.6 ◦ ◦ X ◦
t15 17,189 0.76 6.4 24.0 ◦ ◦ ◦ X
t16 4,133 0.77 11.9 -2.6 X ◦ X ◦
Number of correct predictions 8 7 14 13
Figure 2. Top: All contexts (A,B;X). Red edge is the edge that closes
the triad. Bottom: Surprise values and predictions based on the com-
peting theories of structural balance and status. ti refers to triad con-
texts above; Count: number of contexts ti; P (+): prob. that closing
red edge is positive; sg: surprise of edge initiator giving a positive edge;
sr: surprise of edge destination receiving a positive edge; Bg : consis-
tency of balance with generative surprise; Br: consistency of balance
with receptive surprise; Sg: consistency of status with generative sur-
prise; Sr: consistency of status with receptive surprise.
B had no effect on the sign of the A-B link being formed,
so that each node Ai simply drew the sign of her link to Bi
according to her generative baseline, then we should expect
to see a generative surprise of 0 for this type t.
We set up the corresponding definitions for the nodes Bi as
the recipients of the links. We define the receptive baseline
for this type t of c-link to be the sum of the receptive base-
lines of all nodes Bi, and we define the receptive surprise
sr(t) to be the (signed) number of standard deviations by
which the actual number of positive Ai-Bi edges in the data
differs above or below this expectation.
Incorporating the Role of Status. Finally, we bring the role
of status into this theory. For this, it is useful to return once
more to our motivating example. When a player X on our
hypothetical soccer team gave positive evaluations to both A
and B, we concluded — in the absence of any further infor-
mation — that A and B were likely to have above-average
status. We would have concluded the same thing had A and
B given negative evaluations to X . On the other hand, if
X had evaluated A and B negatively, or had they evaluated
X positively, then we should have concluded that A and B
were more likely than not to have below-average status.
This reasoning provides a way to assign status values to A
and B in any type of c-link, as follows. We first assign the
node X a status of 0. Then, if X links positively to A, or
A links negatively to X , we assign A a status of 1; other-
wise, we assign A a status of −1. We use the same rule for
assigning a status of 1 or −1 to B. Thus we say that the
generative surprise for type t is consistent with status if B’s
status has the same sign as the generative surprise: in this
case, high-status recipients B receive more positive evalua-
tions than would be expected from the generative baseline of
the node A producing the link. We say that the receptive sur-
prise for type t is consistent with status if A’s status has the
opposite sign from the receptive surprise: high-status gen-
erators of links A produce fewer positive evaluations than
would be expected from the receptive baseline of the node
B receiving the link.
Results
We now evaluate the predictions of these theories on the two
networks, Epinions and Wikipedia, for which we have data
on the exact order in which the links were created. We focus
our discussion on Epinions, for which the data is an order of
magnitude larger; the results are quite similar on the smaller
Wikipedia dataset, with differences that we note below.
We consider four theories to explain the signs of the links
that are produced. The first two are the consistency of sta-
tus with generative and receptive surprise, as just defined.
The other two theories are the analogous forms of consis-
tency with Heider’s original notion of balance. Specifically,
we say that Heider balance is consistent with generative sur-
prise for a particular c-link type if the sign of the generative
surprise is equal to the sign of the edge as predicted by bal-
ance. Analogously, we say that Heider balance is consistent
with receptive surprise for a particular c-link type if the sign
of the receptive surprise is equal to the sign of the edge as
predicted by balance.
We find that the predictions of status with respect to both
generative and receptive surprise perform much better against
the data that the predictions of structural balance. Indeed,
status is consistent with generative and receptive surprise on
the vast majority of c-link types; as shown in Figure 2, it
is consistent on 14 and 13 types respectively. This includes
the case of joint endorsement (type t9 in Figure 2) — which
is in fact the most abundant type of c-link in the data — and
also includes the natural counterpart of joint endorsement, in
which A and B each link negatively to X (type t8). It also
includes the case of a positive cycle (type t11), discussed
earlier as well.1
1On the Wikipedia dataset, the results for receptive surprise are
almost identical; status is consistent with receptive surprise on all c-
link types except for the same three exceptional cases as Epinions,
Structural balance is a much weaker fit to the data: balance is
consistent with generative surprise for only 8 of the 16 types
of c-links, and consistent with receptive surprise for only 7
of the 16. We also evaluated consistency of generative and
receptive surprise with respect to Davis’s weaker notion of
balance, with similar results. The one subtlety in evaluat-
ing the data with respect to Davis balance is that Davis’s
theory does not predict the sign of the A-B edge in c-link
types where the two existing edges with X are both negative
(t6, t8, t14, and t16): for these triads, either a positive or a
negative A-B link would be consistent with Davis’s theory,
and so no prediction can be made. Thus, we evaluate consis-
tency of Davis balance with respect to generative and recep-
tive surprise only on the remaining 12 c-link types; here, we
find consistency in 6 and 7 of the 12 cases respectively. This
too is much weaker than the predictions of status.
We also consider the structure of the cases in which status
theory fails to make a correct prediction, analyzing the possi-
ble strengthenings of the theory that this might hint at. First,
we observe that one of the two c-link types where status is
inconsistent with generative surprise is the configuration in
which A and B each link positively to X (type t3). This
is one of the most basic settings for structural balance in
Heider’s work: if two people each like a third party, then
one should expect them to have positive relations. It thus
suggests where users of these systems may be relying on
balance-based reasoning more than status-based reasoning.
We can get further insights from the cases where status the-
ory is inconsistent with the data. In particular, the 16 c-link
types can be divided into four groups of four each, based on
whether A has high or low status relative to X , and whether
B has high or low status relative to X . In looking at where
status theory makes mistakes, it is almost exclusively on the
c-link types where A and B are both posited to have low sta-
tus relative to X . This corresponds to the types t2, t3, t14,
and t15; we observe that with respect to generative surprise,
both of status theory’s mistakes occur on types of this form,
and with respect to receptive surprise, two of status theory’s
three mistakes occur on types of this form.
Even further, the mistakes of status with respect to genera-
tive and receptive surprise on these types constitute natural
“duals” to each other. Note first that if we reverse both the
direction and the sign of an edge, we preserve the status re-
lation of the two endpoints (e.g. a positive link from A to
X or a negative link from X to A both suggest that A has
lower status than X). With this in mind, we observe that if
we take the types t3 and t15 on which status theory makes
its two mistakes with respect to generative surprise, and we
reverse the directions and signs of both edges involving X ,
we get the c-link types t2 and t14 — these are the other two
c-link types where A and B have low status relative to X ,
and they are two of the three types on which status theory
makes mistakes with respect to receptive surprise.
t2, t14, and t16, and one more: t4. We find this close alignment
quite surprising given the very different kinds of activities that the
Epinions and Wikipedia links represent. On Wikipedia, status is
also consistent with generative surprise on 12 of the 16 triad types,
though here the types where there is inconsistency differ more from
Epinions: t14 (as in Epinions), t5, t8, and t16.
Epinions Count Probability
P (+|+) 38,415 0.969
P (−|+) 1,204 0.031
P (+|−) 1,192 0.692
P (−|−) 560 0.308
Wikipedia Count Fraction
P (+|+) 2,509 0.945
P (−|+) 145 0.055
P (+|−) 193 0.706
P (−|−) 80 0.294
Table 4. Edge reciprocation. Given that the first edge was of sign X
P (Y |X) give the probability that reciprocated edge is Y .
It is thus natural to conjecture that the use of signed links de-
viates most strongly from status theory when A is predicted
to impute low status to both herself and B. Now that this be-
havioral asymmetry has been identified in the data, via our
formulation of this theory, developing a more refined theory
of status that takes this asymmetry into account is an inter-
esting direction for further work.
RECIPROCATION OF DIRECTED EDGES
Thus far we have found that balance theory is a reasonable
approximation to the structure of signed networks when they
are viewed as undirected graphs, while status theory bet-
ter captures many of the properties when the networks are
viewed in more detail as directed graphs that grow over time.
To understand the boundary between these two theories and
where they apply, it is interesting to consider a particular
subset of these networks where the directed edges are used
to create symmetric relationships. This subset is the collec-
tion of edges that are reciprocal: cases in which there are
two nodes A and B such that A links to B and B also links
to A. (If the B-A link forms after the A-B link, we say that
B reciprocates the link to A.) In our data, only about 3-5%
of the edges represent the reciprocation of an existing link,
so this is far from being a dominant mode of link creation on
these systems. But it is an interesting mode of link creation,
in that it represents a directly mutual relationship between
two individuals A and B, which is the setting in which bal-
ance theory has been more relevant to our earlier analyses.
Our findings for this type of linking suggest the following
intuitively natural picture: in the relatively small portion
of these networks where mutual back-and-forth interaction
takes place, the principles of balance are more pronounced
than they are in the larger portions of the networks where
signed linking (and hence evaluation of others) takes place
asymmetrically. In other words, users treat each other differ-
ently in the context of back-and-forth interaction than when
they are using links to refer to others who do not link back.
We summarize the results in Table 4. First, we find that
the reciprocation of positive A-B edges is closely consis-
tent with balance rather than status, while the reciprocation
of negative edges seems to follow a hybrid of the two prin-
ciples. Specifically, if A links positively to B, then balance
predicts that B should link positively to A, while status pre-
dicts that B has the higher status and should therefore link
negatively to A. For the two systems in which we have data
on the order of edge creation — Epinions and Wikipedia —
we find that the data clearly supports the balance interpreta-
Epinions Triads P (RSS) P (+|+) P (−|−)
Balanced 348,538 0.929 0.941 0.688
Unbalanced 74,860 0.788 0.834 0.676
Wikipedia Triads P (RSS) P (+|+) P (−|−)
Balanced 53,973 0.912 0.934 0.336
Unbalanced 13,542 0.661 0.878 0.195
Table 5. Edge reciprocation in balanced and unbalanced triads. Tri-
ads: number of balanced/unbalanced triads in the network where one
of the edges was reciprocated. P (RSS): probability that the recipro-
cated edge is of the same sign. P (+|+): probability that the + edge is
later reciprocated with a plus. P (−|−): probability that the − edge is
reciprocated with a minus.
tion, as shown in Table 4. When a B-A link reciprocates a
positive A-B link, this B-A link is positive well over 90%
of the time — much higher than the roughly 80% fraction of
positive links in the system as a whole.
Reciprocation of a negativeA-B link, on the other hand, dis-
plays ingredients of both theories. When A links negatively
to B and B subsequently links to A, balance theory predicts
a negative link while status theory predicts a positive one
(since A should have higher status). In the data, such B-A
links are positive roughly 70% of the time. This shows that
users respond to a negative link with a positive link a major-
ity of the time, but still at a rate below the 80% fraction of
positive links in the system as a whole, suggesting a devia-
tion in the direction of the balanced-based interpretation.
From Table 4, it is also interesting to observe how similar the
probabilities for all kinds of reciprocation are between the
two systems Epinions and Wikipedia. This is particularly
striking given how different the level of public display of
link signs is on these systems; it suggests that these rates of
alignment in the signs are being driven by forces that may be
relatively robust to the way in which link signs are presented.
The Role of Triadic Structure in Reciprocation
We now consider how reciprocation between A and B is
affected by the context of A and B’s relationships to third
nodes X . Specifically, suppose that an A-B link is part of
a directed triad in which each of A and B has a link to or
from a node X . Now, B reciprocates the link to A. As in-
dicated in Table 5, we find that the B-A link is significantly
more likely to have the same sign as the A-B link when the
original triad on A-B-X (viewed as an undirected triad) is
structurally balanced. In other words, when the initial A-B-
X triad is unbalanced, there is more of a latent tendency for
B to “reverse the sign” when she links back to A. The effect
holds in all cases; it is more pronounced in Wikipedia than
in Epinions, which is interesting given the difference in how
public the edge signs are.
This result further indicates how balance-based effects seem
to be at work in the portions of the networks where directed
edges point in both directions, reinforcing mutual relation-
ships. We conjecture that this tension between mutuality and
asymmetry in different parts of the network will be relevant
in understanding more deeply the interplay between status
and balance effects in shaping the formation of links.
FURTHER STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF SIGNED LINKS
Finally, we explore some additional connections between
network structure and the signs of links, focusing on the em-
beddedness of edges and on the subgraphs consisting only of
positive links and only of negative links. For these structural
results, we analyze the networks as undirected graphs.
Embeddedness of positive and negative ties
We begin by trying to characterize the parts of the network
in which positive ties are more likely to occur. Roughly, we
find that positive ties are more likely to be clumped together,
while negative ties tend to act more like bridges between
islands of positive ties.
We explore this issue in Figure 3 by plotting the probabil-
ity that an edge is positive as a function of its embeddedness
, i.e., the number of common neighbors that its endpoints
have [12], or equivalently, the number of distinct triads the
edge participates in. For each dataset we plot two curves.
In green, we show the results of a random-shuffling base-
line — the sign probability we would get as a function of
embeddedness if edge signs were determined randomly and
independently with probability p for each edge. As is clear,
there is no dependence here between an edge’s sign and its
embeddedness, so the green curve is approximately flat.
However, in the real data (red) we see a completely different
picture. Edges that are not well embedded (with endpoints
having fewer than around 10 shared neighbors) tend to be
more negative than expected based on the background prob-
ability p of positive ties. However, as an edge is more em-
bedded (participating in more triads) it tends to be increas-
ingly positive. That is, a link is significantly more likely to
be positive when its two endpoints have multiple neighbors
(of either sign) in common. These findings are consistent
across all three datasets. This suggests that positive edges
tend to occur in better embedded (densely linked) groups of
nodes, while negative edges tend to participate in fewer tri-
angles, which indicates that they act as connections between
the well-embedded sets of positive ties.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this observation is not part
of the formulation of balance theory (and does not follow
from it), but it is consistent with the notion from social-
capital theory of embedded edges being more “on display”
[3, 5]. Moreover, among our three datasets, this phenomenon
is most pronounced for the Wikipedia voting data. This is
also the only one of the three sites where the social relations
are explicitly displayed to a broad set of users — thus putting
the relations even more highly on display. Thus these results
are particularly well explained in terms of implicit pressure
to remain positive.
All-Positive and All-Negative Networks
To explore further the different roles played by positive and
negative links in these networks, we study the sub-networks
composed exclusively of the positive links and exclusively of
the negative links. That is, we define the all-positive network
to be the subgraph consisting only of the positive links, and
the all-negative network to be the subgraph consisting only
of the negative links. We also compare these to randomized
baselines, in which we first randomly shuffle the edge signs
in the full network, and then extract the all-positive and all-
negative networks from these shuffled versions.
Size Clustering Component
Nodes Edges Real Rnd Real Rnd
Epinions: − 119,090 123,602 0.012 0.022 0.308 0.334
Epinions: + 119,090 717,027 0.093 0.077 0.815 0.870
Slashdot: − 82,144 124,130 0.005 0.010 0.423 0.524
Slashdot: + 82,144 425,072 0.025 0.022 0.906 0.909
Wikipedia: − 7,115 21,984 0.028 0.031 0.583 0.612
Wikipedia: + 7,115 81,705 0.130 0.103 0.870 0.918
Table 6. Networks composed of only positive (negative) edges. Real:
network induced on the positive (negative) edges. Rnd: network where
edge signs are randomly permuted. Clustering: fraction of closed tri-
ads (closed triads divided by number of length 2 paths) Component:
fraction of nodes in the largest connected component.
Table 6 summarizes several structural properties of these
networks and their randomized variants. First, we consider
the amount of clustering, defined as the fraction of A-B-C
paths in which the A-C edge is also present (thus forming
a “closed”triad A-B-C). In all three datasets, we find that
the all-positive networks have significantly higher cluster-
ing than their randomized counterparts, and the all-negative
networks have significantly lower clustering. This further
reinforces the observation that positive edges tend to occur
in clumps, while negative edges tend to span clusters.
Interestingly, both the all-positive and all-negative networks
are less well-connected than expected, in the sense that their
largest connected components are smaller than those of their
randomized counterparts. While this may seem initially counter-
intuitive, one possible interpretation is as follows. The giant
components of real social networks are believed to consist
of densely connected clusters linked by less embedded ties
[11, 19]. The all-positive and all-negative networks in the
real (rather than randomized) datasets are each biased to-
ward one side of this balance: the all-positive networks have
dense clusters without the bridging provided by less embed-
ded ties, while the all-negative networks lack a sufficient
abundance of dense clusters to sustain a large component.
We also consider the fraction of nodes that are outliers with
respect to in- and out-degree in the all-positive and all-negative
networks — with degrees exceeding twice the mean for the
network. (For reasons of space, these numerical results are
not shown in the table.) These outlier fractions remain largely
unchanged when the edge signs are randomized, with two
exceptions that each hint at interesting conclusions for the
effects of displaying signed edges to users. First, the frac-
tion of outliers for positive in-degree is higher than expected
on Wikipedia, where edge signs are more public. This sug-
gests a possible tendency for an excess of users to conform
to already positive voting outcomes. Second, the fraction
of outliers for negative out-degree is lower than expected
on Epinions and Slashdot, where edge signs are less pub-
lic. This is a bit more surprising; it suggests that despite the
less public nature of the signs, there are fewer people who
are prolific in their negative evaluations — either because
the dynamics of these sites suppresses this type of people, or
because they are not attracting people who engage in it.
CONCLUSION
Social networks underlying current social media sites often
reflect a mixture of positive and negative links. Here we
have investigated two theories of signed social networks —
balance and status. Balance is a classical theory from so-
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Figure 3. Embeddedness of positive ties in the network. More embedded edges tend to be more positive.
cial psychology, which in its strongest form postulates that
when considering the relationships between three people, ei-
ther only one or all three of the relations should be positive.
Status is a theory of directed signed networks which postu-
lates that when person A makes a positive link to person B,
then A is asserting that B has higher status — with a neg-
ative link from A analogously implying that A believes B
has lower status. These two theories make different predic-
tions for the frequency of different patterns of signed links
in a social network. On networks derived from Epinions,
Slashdot, and Wikipedia, we find that each model predicts
certain kinds of social relationships, and that there is strong
consistency in how the models fit the data across these three
relatively different settings. Moreover, differences in results
between the datasets highlight some interesting aspects of
how the sites present information.
We have discussed the central interpretations of our findings,
and here we briefly review some of the most salient. When
the networks are viewed as undirected graphs, we find strong
evidence for a weak form of structural balance, observing
that in all three datasets triangles with exactly two positive
signs are massively underrepresented in the data relative to
chance, while triangles with three positive edges are over-
represented. We further find that a link is significantly more
likely to be positive when its two endpoints have multiple
neighbors (of either sign) in common — a finding that con-
nects balance with notions from the theory of social capital.
This is particular pronounced for Wikipedia, where the signs
of edges are also the most publicly prominent.
When the networks are viewed as directed graphs, on the
other hand, incorporating the fact that each link is created by
one individual to point to another, we find that many of the
basic predictions of balance theory no longer apply. Instead,
the signs of directed links closely follow the predictions of
the theory of status we develop, in which inferences about
the sign of a link from A to B can be drawn from the mutual
relationships that A and B have to third parties X . The signs
and directions of these relationships to X provide informa-
tion about the status levels of A and B, which in turn accu-
rately predict the deviations in the sign of their interaction
from broader background distributions. Investigating differ-
ent contexts for links, and the differences between one-way
and reciprocated links, sheds further light on the subtle ways
in which users of these systems draw on behaviors rooted in
both balance and status when they link to one another.
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